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I. INTRODUCTION 
The literature of the legal profession speaks of “professional 
independence” or “independence of the bar” as an important or “core” 
professional value or attribute, one that the bar should fight to preserve.1  
 
* Stein Chair and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham Univ. School of Law.  
This article grows out of a presentation on November 9, 2012, as part of the Distinguished Lecture 
Series of the Akron Law Joseph G. Miller and William C. Becker Center for Professional 
Responsibility.  I am grateful to the Center; its director, Frank Quirk, and faculty director, Professor 
John P. Sahl; and the University of Akron School of Law, for the opportunity to make the 
presentation.  For helpful suggestions on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Professor Sahl; to Michele 
DeStefano and Rebecca Roiphe; to participants in the faculty workshop at University of Georgia 
School of Law; and to my Fordham colleagues Aditi Bagchi, Nestor Davidson, Howard Erichson, 
Clare Huntington, Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib, Russ Pearce, and Ben Zipursky.  
 1.  Peter Megargee Brown, The Decline of Lawyers’ Professional Independence, in THE 
LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 23, 24 (1984) 
(“The professional independence of the practicing lawyer is the single most important element in 
providing the legal profession with its strength, character, and integrity. . . .  A lawyer is 
independent when free to perform his or her professional obligations objectively, not only to clients, 
1
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The term has been invoked in the professional literature, including, 
notably, in a 1984 collection of essays by four leading practitioners, one 
a barrister and the others members of the U.S. bar.2 The idea of 
“independence” has also been explored in the academic literature, 
including in a seminal article by Yale law professor and legal historian 
Robert Gordon,3 who identified “the praise of independence [and] the 
fear of its decline” as “one of the great epic themes of professional 
rhetoric.”4 
Peter Margulies has observed that the term is amorphous.5  We 
have a much better sense of what we mean when we talk about “judicial 
independence,” although even there, understandings have evolved over 
time and leave room for debate.6  In contrast, it may not even be clear 
 
but also to the court and to the public interest.”); Alfred P. Carlton Jr., The Road Ahead: On Culture 
and Commitment, 89 A.B.A. J. 8 (Aug. 2003) (“It is a time for us to hold fast to the core values of 
our profession and to jealously guard our professional independence.”); Robert J. Grey Jr., Passing 
the Gavel, Keeping Our Purpose: Lawyers, Remember It’s Your Job to Support Rights of the 
Judiciary and Legal Profession, 91 A.B.A. J. 6 (Aug. 2005) (“It is in our professional best interest, 
and in the best interest of our profession’s future, that we engage in meaningful work to maintain 
our professional independence, which is the only means by which we gain and hold the public’s 
trust.”). 
 2.  THE LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE 
CHALLENGES (1984) (collecting essays by Robert S. Alexander, Peter Megargee Brown, Archibald 
Cox, and Robert B. McKay).  See also The LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: AN IDEAL 
REVISITED (John B. Davidson ed. 1985); Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional 
Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (2003). 
 3.  Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).  For 
additional academic discussions, see, for example, William T. Allen, Corporate Governance and a 
Business Lawyer’s Duty of Independence, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (2004); John S. Dzienkowski & 
Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 405 (2002); Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving 
Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179 (2000); Suzanne Le Mire, 
Testing Times: In-House Counsel and Independence, 14 LEGAL ETHICS 21 (2011); Peter Margulies, 
Lawyers’ Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct, 
Terrorism and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 939, 943-47 (2006); Kevin H. Michaels, 
Lawyer Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 85 (2010); 
Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1931 (2008). 
 4.  Gordon, supra note 3, at 5, 6.  
 5.  See Margulies, supra note 3, at 939 (“Lawyers’ independence has been much celebrated 
but little observed. . . . [T]he fault lies with our amorphous definition of independence.”).   
 6.  See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Keynote Address: Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: 
Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (2003); Stephen B. Burbank, What Do 
We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323 (2003); Viet D. Dinh, Threats to 
Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J. 929 (2007); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca 
Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 
64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAW 497 (2009); J. Clifford Wallace, An Essay on Independence of 
the Judiciary: Independence from What and Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241 (2001); 
Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. 
2
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into what category lawyers’ independence falls. Is it an attribute of 
character, like “professional integrity,” a state of mind like objectivity or 
detachment, or a standard of conduct like avoidance of conflicts of 
interest or preserving client confidences? Is it an aspiration like 
“professional excellence” or an obligation like “professional 
competence”?  Is it a collective trait or an individual trait (or both)?  The 
term turns out to be elusive, in part, because it has multiple meanings;7 
in part, because the various meanings are vague and not well elaborated; 
and, in part, because the various meanings seem to be inconsistent with 
each other or internally contradictory.8 Margulies argues that it is 
quixotic to seek the real meaning of independence and that the term 
should be replaced by others.9  While that may be so, an exploration of 
the shifting meanings of professional independence may provide some 
insights into the evolution of bench-bar relationships and professional 
regulation. 
This article begins with some reflections on the principal meanings 
 
REV. 644 (1999); see generally Amy B. Atchison, Lawrence Tobe Liebert & Denise K. Russell, 
Bibliography, Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: A Selected Bibliography, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 723 (1999).  In general, judicial independence has both a negative and positive 
connotation.  From a negative perspective, judges should be free from the improper outside 
influence of others, including other government officials or branches, third parties, and self-interest.  
From a positive one, judges act based on their own best professional judgment—that is, they should 
objectively interpret the law, objectively apply law to fact, and conduct proceedings in accordance 
with conventional expectations of fairness and impartiality.  Further, we understand that judicial 
conduct rules are designed not so much to dictate that judges act independently in an affirmative 
sense but to secure their independence by protecting judges from outside pressures and influences, 
including those which judges themselves might invite.  For example, the rules limit judges’ work 
and relationships that might lead them to compromise their independence and require judges to 
recuse themselves from cases where their independence might reasonably be questioned.  See 
generally Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should 
Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
941 (2002). 
 7.  Gordon, supra note 3, at 5-6; see also Lawrence J. Fox, MDPs Done Gone: The Silver 
Lining in the Very Black Enron Cloud, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 553-54 (2002) (concept includes 
“independence from influences that would compromise our ardor for our clients,” “independence 
from the client,” and “lawyer self-regulation”).  
 8.  See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 3, at 19-20 (“In grappling with defined problems of 
professional obligation, lawyers differ greatly on how much stress to give each of the two basic and 
fundamentally conflicting ideals of political independence.  One stresses loyalty to the client, even 
at the cost of some warping of the legal framework.  The other emphasizes fidelity to the framework 
and its improvement, even at the cost of sometimes having to resist the pressures of clients.”); Le 
Mire, supra note 3, at 22, 30-37 (identifying four aspects of independence, but arguing that the most 
important is “a personal capacity to exercise independent judgment”); Margulies, supra note 3, at 
945 (describing why “independence is a rhetorical construct that masks conflicting values”).  
 9.  Margulies, supra note 3, at 981 (“Lawyers’ independence is a good slogan in times when 
lawyers have overreached. . . .  [H]owever, ultimately invocations of independence obscure more 
than they illuminate.”). 
3
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of professional independence, as that term is conventionally employed.  
Part II discusses the bar’s collective independence to regulate its 
members.  Part III discusses individual lawyers’ independence in the 
context of professional representations, including independence from 
clients, on one hand, and independence from third parties, on the other.  
Part IV then suggests that there is a meaning of lawyers’ professional 
independence that has largely dropped out of lawyers’ discourse but that 
deserves more attention, namely, lawyers’ independence from the 
courts. This includes at least three aspects: (1) freedom to criticize 
judges; (2) freedom to disobey arguably unlawful court orders; and (3) 
freedom to resolve certain ethical dilemmas for oneself, as a matter of 
professional conscience.  As the bar has become strongly identified and 
allied with the judiciary, motivated by the interests in securing judicial 
protection from other government regulation and in securing the bar’s 
own institutional influence over individual lawyers, it has ignored this 
understanding and redefined professional independence consistently 
with a strong judicial role in regulating lawyers. 
II. PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION: LAWYERS’ COLLECTIVE 
“INDEPENDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT DOMINATION” 
One use of the term “professional independence” refers to lawyers’ 
collective and (relatively) exclusive right to make and enforce the 
applicable standards of conduct.  In the contemporary rhetoric of the bar, 
the bar’s power to regulate itself plays a supporting role to lawyers’ 
individual independence in the course of their legal work, but an 
important role nonetheless. For example, the U.S. organized bar has 
sometimes come to the defense of lawyers in repressive regimes when it 
believes that the foreign bar’s independence, in this respect, is being 
threatened.10 
 
 10.  See, e.g., Press Release, William T. Robinson, III, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, Statement 
Re: Threats to the Independence of Belarus’ Legal Profession (June 19, 2012):  
The American Bar Association is concerned about violations of international law in 
Belarus that present ongoing threats to the independence of the legal profession. . . .  
Belarus’ retaliation against lawyers for representing political opponents and human 
rights activists, and the country’s interference with the administration of the Minsk Bar 
Association, contravenes fundamental human rights enshrined in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  The government of Belarus has also violated the 
right to freedom of expression by retaliating against lawyers speaking on behalf of their 
clients, and it has violated the right of these lawyers to associate with colleagues and 
clients without undue interference.  These developments are in clear breach of the legal 
profession’s core principles, namely the independent regulation of the practice of law 
recognized in Europe, the United States and internationally. 
4
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The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“Model Rules”) focuses on the “independence” of the bar in this sense: 
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional 
calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-
regulation also helps maintain the legal profession’s independence 
from government domination.  An independent legal profession is an 
important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal 
authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members 
are not dependent on government for the right to practice. 
The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special 
responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility 
to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and 
not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar.11 
The Model Rules might be thought to reflect the organized bar’s 
principal effort at self-regulation.  This codification of rules, designed 
for adoption by state courts, reflects the bar’s view of the optimal 
professional norms, mediating among the various roles lawyers play and 
interests they serve.  Its premise is that lawyers have different roles that, 
in a given situation, may push in different directions, giving rise at times 
to difficult questions about the best way to act to resolve the tension 
between different professional values.12 Resolving conflicts between 
lawyers’ various roles, especially between the competing obligations to 
the client and the public, is the central professional challenge for lawyers 
and for those seeking to regulate their conduct.13 The ABA, as the 
largest national representative of the organized bar, has drafted the 
Model Rules, in part, to “prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts” 
while recognizing that no set of rules is comprehensive, and that lawyers 
must sometimes answer hard questions based on general principles.14 
 
 11.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 11, 12 (2013). 
 12.  Id. at pmbl. 1, 9:  
A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of 
the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of 
justice. . . .  In the nature of law practice, . . . conflicting responsibilities are encountered.  
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer’s 
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in 
remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living.  
 13.  See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 
74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005).  
 14.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 9 (2013) (“Within the framework of these 
Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise.  Such issues must be 
resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic 
principles underlying the Rules.”). 
5
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It is not obvious why professionals should have the right to regulate 
themselves;15 for example, one would be skeptical if Wall Street brokers 
claimed a similar right.  One might justify the value of self-regulation in 
various ways, including based on lawyers’ superior expertise.  But the 
bar’s principal rationale is that self-regulation is necessary to secure 
individual lawyers’ independence.16  The fear is that, if the government 
can make the rules for lawyers, it may make repressive rules, which 
undermine lawyers’ ability to perform as independent professionals. 
Consider, for example, the response of the ABA and the European 
bar in December 2011 when they perceived that the International 
Monetary Fund was pressuring Greece, Ireland and Portugal to subject 
their lawyers to non-lawyer regulation.17 A proposed law in Ireland 
urged by the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank (the “Troika”) would have established a Regulator: a regulatory 
body comprised mostly of non-lawyers, to regulate lawyers’ conduct and 
handle discipline and complaints.18  When the U.S. and European bars 
opposed this, they invoked the rhetoric of lawyers’ independence, 
explaining: 
In our view, the establishment of the Regulator will be in clear breach 
of one of the core principles of the legal profession: regulation 
independent from the executive branch of the state—a principle 
recognized in Europe, the United States, and internationally.  It is the 
cornerstone of any democratic society based on the rule of law and 
also necessary for the sound administration of justice. 
We are convinced that without a guarantee of independence—which is 
fundamental to the profession—it is impossible for lawyers to fulfill 
their professional and legal role. 
Self-regulation is characteristic for the legal profession in Europe.  No 
 
 15.  See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 20-21 (1986). 
 16.  See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Conditions of Independence for the Legal Profession, in 
THE LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE, PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 53, 55 
(John B. Davidson, ed., 1985) (maintaining that society is best served when lawyers are independent 
in the sense of “stand[ing] somewhat apart” from the client, both to better serve the client and “to 
serve other, larger, and more diffuse interests than the client immediately recognizes and which the 
client may even prefer to disregard,” and that this ideal can be nurtured and pursued only “by a 
profession whose members are so well guided by their personal sense of professional obligation to 
the public that the public chooses to leave them largely free from outside regulation”).  
 17.  Letter from Georges-Albert Dal, President, Council of Bars and Law Soc’ys of Eur., and 
William T. Robinson, III, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Christine Lagarde, Managing Director, Int’l 
Monetary Fund (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocu
ment/CCBE_and_ABA_letter_1_1325686329.pdf.   
 18.  Id.   
6
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country has total and unrestricted self-regulation of the legal 
profession.  However, there is in all European countries that are 
members of the CCBE a significant extent of self-regulation.  In the 
United States, there is in general regulation by the courts, which 
similarly satisfies the principle of independence from executive 
regulation. 
We believe that independent regulation, conceptually, must be seen as 
a logical and natural consequence of the independence of the 
profession.  It addresses the collective independence of the members of 
the legal profession and is nothing less than a structural defense of the 
independence of the individual lawyer, which requires a lawyer to be 
free from improper influence, especially such as may arise from his/her 
personal interests or external pressure (including government 
pressure).19 
Are U.S. lawyers independent?  Given the regulatory role of the 
U.S. courts, the U.S. bar may be overstating or mischaracterizing its 
“independence” to regulate its members.  As the Model Rules’ Preamble 
concedes, lawyers’ autonomy is “relative.”20  The late professor Fred 
Zacharias, more pointedly characterized self-regulation as a “myth.”21  
Historically, the courts regulate U.S. lawyers.  When bar associations 
argue for preserving lawyers’ “independence,” it is really advancing an 
idea of separation of powers: that the courts should have (relatively) 
exclusive authority to regulate lawyers as “officers of the court.”22 
Deep down, the bar might regard judicial regulation of lawyers as 
merely the lesser of two evils, but at least outwardly it embraces the 
concept. As I discussed several years ago, the ABA has a “strong 
historic commitment to state judicial regulation,” which it “resoundingly 
affirmed . . . in 2002 when it adopted multijurisdictional practice 
reforms.”  The ABA reaffirmed its support for judicial regulation more 
recently when it “opposed federal administrative regulation of lawyers’ 
practice, in part, because federal regulation interferes with state judicial 
regulation.”23 While espousing its commitment to self-regulation, 
 
 19.  Id. at 2.   
 20.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 12 (2013).  
 21.  Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1189 (2009).  
 22.  For a discussion of lawyers’ professional identity as “officers of the court” and the 
significance of the role, see Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, What is a Lawyer? A Reconstruction of 
the Lawyer as an Officer of the Court, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 425 (2012). 
 23.  Bruce A. Green, ABA Ethics Reform from “MDP” to “20/20”: Some Cautionary 
Reflections, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 6 (2009).  See also ABA, Independence of the Legal Profession, 
AM. BAR ASSOC., http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_
policy/independence_of_the_legal_profession.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (“[T]he ABA 
7
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beginning in the early 20th century the ABA has in fact promoted the 
judiciary’s expansion of its regulatory authority over lawyers.  The ABA 
has drafted model disciplinary rules, lobbied courts to adopt them, and 
urged courts to establish or oversee more professional and robust 
disciplinary processes to enforce them.24  One can reconcile judicial 
regulation with professional self-regulation if one regards the judiciary 
as a specialized branch of the legal profession.  Dana Remus recently 
explored this concept from a different perspective in an article focusing 
on the legal profession’s role in regulating the judiciary.25  She argued 
that in part by reconceptualizing the judiciary as a subset of the legal 
profession, the bar in the 20th century asserted a role in regulating 
judges, thereby “increasing its own power at the expense of judicial 
power.”26  She described this as a shift from an earlier period when 
“[l]awyers played an important quasi-governmental role as officers of 
the court, but remained beholden to judiciaries as the regulators of the 
practice of law.”27  Although Remus’s principal point was that lawyers’ 
regulatory influence over the judiciary erodes judicial independence, she 
also envisioned the relationship as weakening the bar’s independence.28 
Some bar leaders have acknowledged that the idea of lawyers’ 
professional “independence” is less robust in the U.S. than in some other 
countries, but nonetheless see judicial regulation as far preferable to 
executive or legislative regulation of the bar. For example, former 
N.Y.C. bar president Evan Davis observed that: 
[a]round the world the legal profession operates under varying degrees 
of independence.  In a few places it is still self-regulated in the sense 
that it defines its own rules of ethics and disciplines its own members.  
In other countries the bar is heavily regulated by the political branches 
of government. . . .  In my opinion, it is very important for the bar to be 
independent of the political branches of government.  It has not been a 
problem that in the United States the bar has come to be regulated by 
the judiciary because of the judiciary’s own neutrality; it would be a 
huge problem if the bar were regulated by the Department of Justice or 
 
opposes federal legislation or rules that would undermine traditional state court regulation of 
lawyers, interfere with the confidential attorney-client relationship, or otherwise impose excessive 
new federal regulations on lawyers engaged in the practice of law.”) (listing ABA policies).  
 24.  See, e.g., James A. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2491-99 (2003); Zacharias, supra note 21, at 1160-63. 
 25.  Dana Ann Remus, Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships, 30 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 123 (2012).  
 26.  Id. at 145. 
 27.  Id. at 134. 
 28.  Id. at 151-55. 
8
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by the various elected or appointed state attorneys general.  It would be 
much harder to resist either gentle or firm governmental pressure if the 
government’s lawyers decided how the bar in general or you, as an 
attorney, in particular, should behave.29 
Two points should be noted here.  First, if one assumes that 
lawyers’ individual independence in the U.S. depends on judicial 
regulation, then lawyers have a strong stake in the preservation of 
judicial independence from the executive and legislative branches.  If the 
judiciary is subject to outside pressure from other government branches, 
then the judiciary may not be in a position to insulate the bar and 
professional regulation.  Consequently, in a system such as ours where 
courts oversee the bar, the bar has an interest in promoting not only the 
relative exclusivity of judicial regulation, but also judicial independence 
in exercising that authority.  For this, among other reasons, the bar has 
an interest in promoting public respect for the judiciary. 
Second, it is undoubtedly true that judicial regulation is preferable 
to regulation by the executive branch, which is often a party to litigation.  
The specter of executive officials regulating opposing counsel would be 
disquieting.30  But the question to which I will later return is this: Might 
judicial regulation itself be problematic, albeit to a different degree?  
The problem is most likely to arise when the judiciary seeks to resolve 
tensions between lawyers’ duties to the court and other obligations.  The 
judiciary is not a disinterested arbiter in that scenario.  Further, 
individual judges may overvalue institutional interests when they 
interpret and apply professional standards.  Should lawyers be more 
independent from courts?  Does the bar’s endorsement of the courts’ 
regulatory role undermine lawyers’ independence? 
III. INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS’ INDEPENDENCE 
Independence of the bar is viewed as an individual attribute, not 
just a collective one. But the term is conventionally used in two 
seemingly conflicting ways. At times, “professional independence” 
 
 29.  Davis, supra note 2, at 1291. 
 30.  See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 327, 369 (1998) (noting concerns when prosecutors bring criminal prosecutions of criminal 
defense lawyers who represented opposing parties).  Similar doubts were raised some years ago 
when lawyers in the executive branch sought to exempt themselves from judicial regulation and to 
regulate themselves.  See Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern 
Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 
469-89 (1996) (discussing DOJ’s adoption of internal regulation meant to preempt courts’ 
professional conduct rules governing its lawyers’ communications with opposing parties). 
9
Green: Lawyers' Professional Indepedence
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
VOL. 46, NO. 3 - ARTICLE 1 - GREEN (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/2013  10:05 AM 
608 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:599 
means independence from clients. This can be either a state of mind, 
e.g., detachment or objectivity, or something more tangible.  At other 
times, “professional independence” implies independence from the 
pressures and influences of others who might compromise lawyers’ 
loyalty to clients.  That is the principal sense in which it is used in Rule 
5.4 of the Model Rules.31 
A.  Independence from Clients 
As Professor Gordon’s article explores, critics of the U.S. bar for 
more than a century have viewed independence from clients as an 
important virtue and expressed concern about lawyers’ lack of it.32  
Abraham Lincoln might be identified as an exemplar of this virtue,33 
which reflects a willingness to displease clients by, for example, telling 
them what you believe to be true but they do not want to hear, or turning 
down clients seeking socially unworthy, not merely unlawful, objectives.  
The following story of how Lincoln advised a client was told by 
Lincoln’s law partner, William Herndon, and then recounted by Illinois 
Supreme Court Judge Orrin N. Carter in his 1915 volume on legal 
ethics.34  Lincoln reportedly told the client: 
We can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set a whole 
neighborhood at loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and 
her six fatherless children, and thereby get for you $600 to which you 
seem to have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs, it appears to 
us, as much to the woman and children as it does to you.  We will not 
take your case, but we will give you a little advice, for which we will 
charge you nothing.  You seem to be a sprightly, energetic man.  We 
would advise you to try your hand at making six hundred dollars in 
some other way.35 
Lincoln could have accepted the representation; the client had a 
colorable legal claim and may even have won.36  In turning down the 
 
 31.  Rule 5.4 has also been said to insulate lawyers from outside influences that might 
compromise their ability to act consistently with public obligations, such as their duty of candor to 
the court or their pro bono obligations.  
 32.  Gordon, supra note 3, at 34, 48.  See also Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 81-82 (2007) (“The bar as whole likes to think of lawyers as capable of 
exercising professional judgment independently of client desires and capable of taking moral stands 
that produce appropriate client behavior.”). 
 33.  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1, at 30-31. 
 34.  ORRIN N. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1915). 
 35.  Id. at 52 (quoting FREDERICK TREVOR HILL, LINCOLN, THE LAWYER 102, 239 (1906)).   
 36.  Id.   
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representation, Lincoln lost a fee and perhaps even a client.  Acting in 
accordance with his sense of professional duty, however, Lincoln gave 
advice that he thought reflected the client’s best interest as a member of 
the community, if not the client’s optimal financial interest.37 
Contemporary legal ethicists have embraced the story and 
appropriated it to various purposes.38  For example, my colleague 
Russell Pearce and I did so in an article describing lawyers’ role as 
“civics teachers,”39 by which we meant, in part, 
that when lawyers counsel clients about their legal rights and 
obligations, and about how to act within the framework of the law, 
lawyers invariably teach clients not only about the law and legal 
institutions, but also, . . . about rights and obligations in a civil society 
that may not be established by enforceable law—including ideas about 
fair dealing, respect for others, and, generally, concern for the public 
good.40 
Additionally, we suggested, lawyers teach by example when they 
“address their own legal obligations in the course of a representation.”41 
Lincoln’s story was principally about the lawyer in the role of 
advisor. Others who discuss lawyers’ independence from clients 
similarly focus on the counseling function.  A recurrent popular concern 
is that when clients act badly, it is sometimes because of their lawyers’ 
failure to give independent advice that directs the client to broad 
considerations weighing against the client’s preferred course of 
conduct—for example, advice that is not just legally or technically 
accurate but that takes into account the spirit or purpose of the law or 
broader societal concerns beyond obeying the law.42  William Allen has 
 
 37.  Id.   
 38.  See, e.g., Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle’s Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One of a 
Study on Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 49 (1995/1996); Robert 
P. Lawry, Images and Aspirations: A Call for a Return to Ethics for Lawyers, 48 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 199, 213 (2011); David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 637; Michael S. McGinniss, Virtue Ethics, Earnestness, and the 
Deciding Lawyer: Human Flourishing in a Legal Community, 87 N. DAK. L. REV. 19, 46 (2011); 
Aziz Rana, Legal Independence and the Problem of Democratic Citizenship, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1665, 1700 (2009). 
 39.  Bruce A. Green & Russell Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at Home”: The Lawyer as 
Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207, 1212 (2009).  
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 1213. 
 42.  For example, Judge Stanley Sporkin famously asked regarding wrongdoing by officials 
of a financial institution, “where . . . were the . . . attorneys when these transactions were 
effectuated?”  Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (Sporkin, 
J.).  See, e.g., Symposium Transcript, After Sarbanes-Oxley: A Panel Discussion on Law and Legal 
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spoken of “the duty of independence” in advising business clients about 
compliance with the law, by which he means “the lawyer’s duty to the 
legal system and to the substantive values it incorporates.”43  He says 
that this is an “aspect of lawyer’s duty that we do not much notice and 
have not for a long time.”44  Likewise, Archibald Cox suggested that 
“[t]he independent lawyer’ develops the capacity for taking a longer and 
broader view than the first look of many clients engaged in pressing 
immediate self-advantage.”45  Robert Gordon referred to the exercise of 
this type of independence in advising clients as “purposive lawyering or 
public-minded counseling.”46  One might view independence, in this 
sense, as being in tension with the ideal of the lawyer as the “zealous 
advocate.”47 
The Model Rules recognize lawyers’ independence from clients, 
emphasizing objectivity and broad-mindedness in advice-giving.  Model 
Rule 2.1 (“Advisor”) provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice.  In rendering advice, 
a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to 
the client’s situation.48 
The first part of the rule is framed in mandatory terms.  Kevin Michels 
has argued that the rule demands that lawyers may not tell clients what 
 
Ethics in the Era of Corporate Scandal, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 67, 68 (2003) (quoting Father 
Robert Drinan regarding the collapse of Enron).  David Wilkins’s article about the changing nature 
of the corporate attorney-client relationship raises questions about the sustainability of the 
independent advice-giving function, assuming it ever was realistic.  David B. Wilkins, Team of 
Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2067, 2085-89 (2010).  Of course, some might question how often corporate lawyers are to blame 
for corporate clients’ questionable or improper conduct and posit that clients who engaged in 
questionable conduct may have withheld relevant information from their lawyers or ignored their 
lawyers’ advice.  Because of attorney-client confidentiality, it is sometimes impossible to know 
what role lawyers’ advice played in client decision-making.  
 43.  Allen, supra note 3, at 3. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Cox, supra note 16, at 59. 
 46.  Gordon, supra note 3, at 33. 
 47.  Allen, supra note 3, at 11, 13.  See also Bruce A. Green, Thoughts About Corporate 
Lawyers After Reading The Cigarette Papers: Has the “Wise Counselor” Given Way to the “Hired 
Gun”?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407 (2001).  In contrast, Katherine Kruse has argued that the problem 
is not that lawyers ignore broad societal values but that they ignore clients’ own non-legal concerns.  
Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 154 
(2010) (identifying, as a central problem of legal professionalism, “the narrow construction of client 
objectives in terms of legal interests and disengagement from client values”). 
 48.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1. (2013).  
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they want to hear or what will best advance their objectives, but must 
“employ accepted professional standards of legal interpretation and 
reasoning to interpret the law and apply it to the client’s facts to form the 
conclusions that will ground her legal advice.”49 
When the so-called “torture memos” were released, many perceived 
that the authors in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel 
flunked this test in advising that water boarding was not torture, because 
they told the Administration what it wanted to hear, not the conclusion 
dictated by conventional principles of legal interpretation.50  Although 
the authors escaped both internal Justice Department discipline and bar 
discipline that some thought was warranted, there have been occasions 
(though not many) in which other lawyers have been sanctioned for 
failing to “exercise independent professional judgment and render 
candid advice.”51 
In the realm of advocacy, in contrast to counseling, the professional 
conduct rules are less emphatic about lawyers’ independence.  If one 
took a strong view of independence in the advocacy role, lawyers would 
have considerable discretion to serve public interests that may be in 
tension with their clients’ interests or desires.  Consider, for example, the 
nineteenth century understanding of an advocate’s independence, as 
expressed by John Inglis, Lord President of the Court of Session, in 
Batchelor v. Pattison & Mackersy:52 
[T]he nature of the advocate’s office makes it clear that in the 
performance of his duty he must be entirely independent, and act 
according to his own discretion and judgement in the conduct of the 
cause for his client.  His legal right is to conduct the cause without any 
regard to the wishes of his client, so long as his mandate is 
unrecalled, . . .53 
 
 49.  Michaels, supra note 3, at 117.  See also Bruce A. Green, Taking Cues: Inferring Legality 
from Others’ Conduct, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429 (2006).   
 50.  See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Tortured Reasoning, AM. LAW., June 14, 2004, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005539346&Tortured_Reasoning&slreturn=2013033017
3309; W. Bradley Wendel, The Torture Memos and the Demands of Legality, 12 LEGAL ETHICS 
107, 115-16 (2009) (book review); Fred C. Zacharias, Practice, Theory, and the War on Terror, 59 
EMORY L.J. 333, 336-42 (2009). 
 51.  See ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
287-88 (7th ed. 2011). 
 52.  3 R. 914, 918 (1876).  
 53.  According to the “Guide to the Professional Conduct of Advocates” published by the 
Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, the decision’s “view of the powers and liabilities of an Advocate 
has been considerably altered by practice and case law in succeeding generations.”  GUIDE TO THE 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF ADVOCATES 1.2.2 (4th ed. 2007).  
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The Model Rules provide hardly any discretion of this sort.  In 
general, the rules do not take a stand on whether a lawyer may disregard 
a client’s direction about how to conduct the representation, whether to 
serve other interests or to better serve the client’s interests: 
On occasion . . . a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to 
be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. . . .  Because of the 
varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might 
disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the 
interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe 
how such disagreements are to be resolved.  Other law, however, may 
be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer.54 
The rules timidly acknowledge one small aspect of advocacy in 
which a lawyer, as advocate, may disregard a client’s lawful interests or 
instruction: 
The lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the 
use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved 
in the legal process with courtesy and respect. . . .  A lawyer’s duty to 
act with reasonable promptness . . . does not preclude the lawyer from 
agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not 
prejudice the lawyer’s client.55 
Additionally, lawyers have some latitude to terminate a representation 
when their view of the best course of action conflicts with the client’s 
view, or when the client’s direction or objectives are anti-social (but 
lawful) or at odds with other professional values: “If . . . efforts [to 
resolve disagreements with the client] are unavailing and the lawyer has 
a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw 
from the representation.”56  And, as noted below,57 lawyers have limited 
 
 54.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2013); see David Luban, Lawyers as 
Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 
824-30 (2005); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 
MD. L. REV. 213, 222-26 (1991); see generally CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005 
(2006). 
 55.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmts. 1, 3 (2013); cf. MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(B) (1980) (“In his representation of a client, a lawyer may: (1) 
Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of 
his client.  (2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful, even though 
there is some support for an argument that the conduct is legal.”). 
 56.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2013) (citing MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2013)) (“[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client 
if . . . the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the 
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.”). 
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discretion to disclose client confidences to serve circumscribed public 
ends.58 
In the end, the idea of lawyers’ independence from clients is in 
tension with the more compelling idea of the lawyer as agent of, or 
zealous advocate for, the client, and not nearly as well elaborated in the 
professional codes or literature.  The idea is in part subjective and in part 
aspirational, but it is not easily translated into specific conduct or rules 
for behavior.  In particular, the professional codes do not embody a 
strong commitment to the idea that a lawyer may act contrary to client 
interests or demands so as to serve competing professional interests.  
Independence seems like something that lawyers exercise in the 
interstices, where client interests and objectives are not in jeopardy. 
B. Independence from Third Parties 
“Professional independence” also refers to individual lawyers’ 
independence from third parties who might cause lawyers to 
compromise their professional duties to the client or, to a lesser extent, 
the public.  John Adams’s defense of British soldiers after the Boston 
Massacre exemplifies independence in this sense.59  In 1770, British 
soldiers who were pelted with stones and other objects opened fire on a 
crowd, killing five.60  Adams agreed to defend the soldiers when others 
would not do so.61 As David McCullough’s biography of Adams 
describes,62 Adams was “firm in the belief . . . that no man in a free 
country should be denied the right to counsel and a fair trial . . .  As a 
lawyer, his duty was clear.  That he would be hazarding his hard-earned 
reputation and, in [Adams’] words, ‘incurring a clamor and popular 
suspicions and prejudices’ against him, was obvious . . .”63  Adams’ 
“virtuoso performance” in arguing that the soldiers had acted in self-
defense, won an acquittal of six of the eight soldiers put on trial and 
spared the lives of the other two, who had fired directly into the crowd 
 
 57.  See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.  
 58.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2013); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. 
Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 277 (2006).   
 59.  Robert S. Alexander, The History of the Law as an Independent Profession and the 
Present English System, in THE LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT 
THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 1, 15 (1984).  
 60.  John Adams and the Boston Massacre, ACLU, (May 8, 2008), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/john-adams-and-boston-massacre. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 65, 68 (2001). 
 63.  Id. at 66.  
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but were convicted only of manslaughter.64  Three years later, Adams 
wrote in his diary: 
The Part I took in Defence of Cptn. Preston and the Soldiers, procured 
me Anxiety, and obloquy enough.  It was, however, one of the most 
gallant, generous, manly and disinterested Actions of my whole Life, 
and one of the best Pieces of Service I ever rendered my Country.  
Judgment of Death against those Soldiers would have been as foul a 
Stain upon this Country as the Executions of the Quakers or Witches, 
anciently.  As the Evidence was, the Verdict of the Jury was exactly 
right.65 
Adams’ defense of the British soldiers is often invoked as an 
example of lawyers’ duty to defend unpopular causes.66  For example, 
more than two centuries later, the American Civil Liberties Union and 
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers gave the name 
“the John Adams Project” to their efforts to oppose the military tribunals 
in Guantanamo.67  Justice Black may have had Adams’s example in 
mind when he wrote for the Supreme Court: 
Undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service to a client are prized 
traditions of the American lawyer.  It is this kind of service for which 
the Sixth Amendment makes provision.  And nowhere is this service 
deemed more honorable than in case of appointment to represent an 
accused too poor to hire a lawyer, even though the accused may be a 
member of an unpopular or hated group, or may be charged with an 
offense which is peculiarly abhorrent.68 
Atticus Finch is, of course, another popular, albeit fictional, example.69 
Adams’ defense of the British soldiers reflects a muscular idea of 
professional independence.  The idea embodies not only an expectation 
 
 64.  Id. at 67. 
 65.  JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 79 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 
The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1961) (1815). 
 66.  See, e.g., Mark Brodin, What One Lawyer Can Do for Society: Lessons from the 
Remarkable Career of William P. Homans Jr., 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 41, 42 (2011); Laurel E. 
Fletcher, Defending the Rule of Law: Reconceptualizing Guantanamo Habeas Attorneys, 44 CONN. 
L. REV. 617, 626 (2012); Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney 
Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 81-82 (2011). 
 67.  John Adams Project—American Values, ACLU (Apr. 4, 2008), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/john-adams-project-american-values.   
 68.  Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26 (1948).   
 69.  See, e.g., Mary A. Lynch, An Evaluation of Ten Concerns About Using Outcomes in 
Legal Education, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 976, 991-92 (2012); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tending to 
Potted Plants: The Professional Identity Vacuum in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 12 NEV. L.J. 703, 705 n.11 
(2012).  But see Monroe Freedman, Atticus Finch, Esq., R.I.P., LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 24, 1992, at 20-
21. 
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about lawyers’ professional conduct but also about their professional 
character.  The assumption is that lawyers, as a matter of professional 
commitment and training, have the backbone to defy self-interest and 
outside pressures, including from friends and members of their 
community, which would deter them from fulfilling their sense of 
professional duty to clients and to the public.  Adams did not need 
buffeting from the public, nor did he receive it, because he had internal 
professional fortitude. 
How weak and flabby lawyers have become, at least in the ABA’s 
evident view, since Adams’ day.  In the ABA ethics rules, the only 
explicit reference to individual lawyers’ independence is in a fairly 
trivial rule designed, it is said, to protect lawyers from the corrosive 
influence of non-lawyers and corporations.70 The principal and most 
enduring discussion of professional independence over the past fifteen 
years has been in the context of a debate over whether the rule can be 
slightly liberalized to align the U.S. bar with that of other countries, in 
which lawyers can have non-lawyer partners and law firms can seek 
outside capital.71 
Titled “Professional Independence Of A Lawyer,” ABA Model 
Rule 5.4 does not affirmatively define “independence” or establish a 
duty to act independently.72  Rather, it identifies restrictions on lawyers 
that are presumably designed to protect or secure lawyers’ 
independence, whatever that may mean.  These include: (1) a restriction 
on sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer;73 (2) a prohibition on practicing 
law in partnerships or professional corporations or associations with 
non-lawyers;74 and (3) a requirement that lawyers ensure that third 
parties who retain them or pay for their services on behalf of a client do 
not interfere with their exercise of professional judgment.75 The 
accompanying Comment explains that, “These limitations are to protect 
the lawyer’s professional independence of judgment.”76 
Although it is clear that lawyers are expected to be independent 
from third parties, it is less clear what lawyers are expected to do with 
their independence.  The focus of Rule 5.4 is on preventing interference, 
 
 70.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013).   
 71.  See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and 
the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2196-98 (2010). 
 72.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013).   
 73.  Id. at R. 5.4(a). 
 74.  Id. at R. 5.4(b), R. 5.4(d). 
 75.  Id. at R. 5.4 (c).   
 76.  Id. at R. 5.4 cmt. 1. 
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itself an underdeveloped concept.77  But interference with what?  What 
is “independence of judgment”?  The rules do not define this attribute in 
affirmative terms. 
Rule 5.4 is essentially a conflict of interest rule.  This was the 
understanding reflected in much of the rhetoric surrounding the debate in 
2000 when the ABA House of Delegates rejected an ABA commission’s 
proposal to liberalize the rule to permit “multidisciplinary practice.”78  
Opponents argued that restrictions on alliances with non-lawyers were 
necessary to protect “core values,” meaning that third parties would 
induce lawyers to violate their agency duties to clients and their duties to 
the court.79  In response to efforts of a more recent body, the ABA’s 
Ethics 20/20 Commission, to reexamine multidisciplinary practices 
particularly in light of innovations in England and Australia, critics 
invoked the rhetoric of professional independence as they had earlier.80 
 
 77.  See Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the Anti-
Interference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469, 1519-22 (2000).  
 78.  See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-423 at 3 & n.6 
(2001):  
The prohibitions in Rule 5.4 are directed mainly against entrepreneurial relationships 
with nonlawyers and primarily are for the purpose of protecting a lawyer’s independence 
in exercising professional judgment on the client’s behalf free from control by 
nonlawyers. . . .   
 
The rule was developed in the ABA House of Delegates during debates on the Kutak 
Commission’s Proposed Rule 5.4, which the House rejected. . . .  Threats to lawyer 
professional independence resulting from corporate ownership or public investment in 
law firms led the House of Delegates to substitute nearly verbatim the provisions of the 
disciplinary rules in the former Model Code of Professional Conduct for the Kutak 
Commission’s proposal. . . .  In February and August 2000, concern that admission of 
nonlawyer professionals as partners in law firms would interfere with lawyers’ 
professional independence and the preservation of the core values of the profession led 
the House of Delegates to reject proposals to allow partnerships with nonlawyer 
professionals and to direct that no change be made to Rule 5.4.  
 79.  See, e.g., Robert L. Ostertag, Multidisciplinary Practice: Our Profession is Not for Sale, 
18 GPSOLO 22 (Jan./Feb. 2001) (“Lawyers have, among others, three core values built into our 
Codes of Professional Responsibility that the Big 5 want us to eliminate—our total independence 
from outside influence in the representation of our clients, our undivided loyalty toward our clients, 
and our obligation to maintain their confidences and secrets. . . .  [I]f lawyer-controlled MDP firms 
are to function solely on behalf of our clients, how may accountants meet their publicly directed 
obligations when called upon to do so, without infringing on our own client-directed core values? 
How can lawyers function for their clients when their independence and loyalty are necessarily to be 
divided between their responsibilities to clients and their responsibilities to their accountant partners 
or employers?”). 
 80.  In August 2012, the Illinois State Bar Association proposed a Resolution in the ABA 
House of Delegates designed to preempt consideration of reforms to the ABA Model Rules that 
might liberalize restrictions on lawyers’ alliances with non-lawyers.  The proposed resolution, 
which was not adopted, provided:  
The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership or control of the practice 
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Rule 5.4 raises doubts about whether the bar still expects lawyers to 
cultivate independence as a trait of character.  If in an earlier day 
lawyers could be counted on to withstand outside pressure in order to do 
what they thought was right as a matter of professional duty, the premise 
of Rule 5.4 is that lawyers need special protection against outside 
influence.81 
Lawyers in other countries, such as England and Australia, now 
have the ability to collaborate with non-lawyer professionals in ways 
forbidden by the U.S. rules, such as by taking in non-lawyer partners or 
accepting non-lawyer investors in their firms.82  So far, there have been 
no documented reports of lawyers sacrificing their independence as a 
consequence.  Indeed, non-lawyers have been permitted to become firm 
partners in Washington, D.C., without evident harm.83 
Wholly apart from recent experience, one might be skeptical of the 
 
of law by non-lawyers are inconsistent with the core values of the legal profession.  The 
law governing lawyers that prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with non-lawyers 
and from directly or indirectly transferring to non-lawyers ownership or control over 
entities practicing law should not be revised. 
ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N & SENIOR LAWYERS DIV., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 1 (2012).   
The accompanying report maintained, in part:  
Affirmation of these core principles and values is important now, particularly at a time 
when technological advances and globalization are pressuring the profession to lessen its 
commitment to the public and to professional independence. . . .  The evils of fee sharing 
with nonlawyers in jurisdictions that permit nonlawyer ownership can have the same 
deleterious effect on lawyer independence and control as any other fee sharing with 
nonlawyers.  The American concept and practice of lawyer independence is as important 
to proclaim and advocate throughout the world as is due process and the rule of law 
abroad. 
Id. at 2, 5. 
 81.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013).   
 82.  See generally Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in 
the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2843 (2012); John Flood, The 
Consequences of Clementi: The Global Repercussions for the Legal Profession After the Legal 
Services Act of 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537, 545-56; Stephen Gillers, A Profession, If You 
Can Keep It: How Technology and Fading Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What 
We Should Do About It, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 1008 (2012); Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing 
the Delivery of Legal Services: On the First Amendment Rights of Corporations and Individuals, 73 
OHIO ST. L.J 1, 7-8 (2012); Thomas D. Morgan, The Rise of Institutional Law Practice, 40 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1005, 1019-20 (2012); Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and 
Australian Reforms With U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practices, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13, 15; 
Carole Silver, What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us: The Need for Empirical Research in Regulating 
Lawyers and Legal Services in the Global Economy, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1009 (2010); Heather A. 
Miller, Note, Don’t Just Check “Yes” or “No”: The Need for Broader Consideration of Outside 
Investment in the Law, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 312. 
 83.  See generally Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of 
Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 217, 245-46 (2000). 
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particular procedural protections codified in Rule 5.4 for at least two 
reasons.  First, one can rationalize almost any procedural measure as a 
safeguard of “independence.”  For example, in England, the requirement 
that barristers accept all cases, the “cab rank principle,” without regard 
to their view of the merits has been justified on this ground: “The 
relationship with the independence of the bar lies in the impossibility for 
the most part of associating certain barristers or chambers with certain 
causes or attitudes.”84  In contrast, in the United States, the ability to turn 
down an unworthy client is regarded as an expression of independence, 
and lawyers are permitted to ally themselves with particular clients (as in 
the case of in-house counsel) and causes (as in the case of lawyers for 
interest groups).  Likewise, in England, the requirement that barristers be 
individual practitioners, not members of partnerships, is thought to 
promote their independence.85 In contrast, in the United States, we 
assume that working in a firm makes lawyers better regulated.86 
Second, as I discussed in an article at the time of the MDP debate, 
what passes as a protection for lawyer independence may largely be 
designed to protect lawyers’ monopoly.87 Rule 5.4 originated in 
legislation aimed at forbidding lawyers from being employed by 
corporations to provide services to members of the public.88  The 
proponents of the legislation had no evidence that the corporations then 
supplying lawyers to clients were harming the public, and the 
transparent motivation behind the legislation was to protect lawyers’ 
business.89  Since that time, as Professor Gordon also observed in the 
context of the MDP debates: 
 
 84.  Alexander, supra note 59, at 1, 14.  
 85.  Id. at 14 (“The rule that barristers are individual practitioners maintains a system in 
which the lawyer is never committed to a sole client for work and fees but can advise impartially 
and objectively.  It confers upon the bar a most important attribute of independence, the right to be 
free from any external pressure or fear of reprisals, based solely upon what the lawyer considers the 
law to be.”).   
 86.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1, 5.2 (2013); see generally Elizabeth 
Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A 
Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (2002); Thomas D. Morgan, The Rise of 
Institutional Law Practice, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005 (2012); Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm 
Partners as Their Brothers’ Keepers, 96 KY. L.J. 231, 252 (2008); Ted Schneyer, Professional 
Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1991); Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: 
Reflections on How Law Influences the “Ethical Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 
245 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992). 
 87.  Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their 
Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 1115 (2000). 
 88.  Id. at 1120-33.  
 89.  Id. at 1134-35.  
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Historically, the sad if hardly surprising fact has been that the 
organized bar’s resistance to new modes of practice, though often 
clothed in the high-minded rhetoric of protecting the ethical standards 
and independent judgment of the legal profession, has been to a 
considerable extent motivated by far less elevated desires to protect the 
incomes of lawyers from economic competition or their status from 
erosion by groups perceived as interlopers.90   
 The rhetoric surrounding the opposition to liberalizing Rule 5.4 
signifies one respect in which the bar has overvalued professional 
independence.  In much of the bar’s rhetoric in other contexts, the 
threats to the bar’s independence come from the executive and 
legislative branches of government or the general public.  In the one 
ethics rule with “independence” in its title, these threats are not 
identified; nor are lawyers encouraged to stare them down.91  Rather, 
the enemy at the gate of independence is envisioned as . . . 
accountants!92 The rule trivializes the ideal of professional 
independence as it diminishes legal professionals.  Surely, the bar 
could project a loftier ideal of independence and express greater 
confidence in lawyers’ fortitude. 
IV. INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS’ INDEPENDENCE FROM THE JUDICIARY 
One aspect of “professional independence” that has largely dropped 
out of the professional discourse is the idea of independence not simply 
from clients and third parties in general, but from the judiciary in 
particular.  Dana Remus addressed this idea to a limited extent while 
examining the profession’s role in regulating the judiciary,93 which she 
 
 90.  Letter from Robert W. Gordon, Professor, Yale Law School, to Sherwin P. Simmons, 
Chair, ABA Comm’n on Multidisciplinary Practice (May 21, 1999).  After surveying the meanings 
of professional independence, Professor Gordon concluded his letter: “[T]here are surely better 
ways of protecting professional independence than by restricting the development of forms of multi-
disciplinary practice that promise many benefits in innovation and cost-effective services to clients 
and consumers.”  Id.  See also Paton, supra note 71. 
 91.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013).   
 92.  See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul 
Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. Rev. 1097 
(2000); Ostertag, supra note 79; see generally Kathryn Lolita Yarbrough, Multidisciplinary 
Practices: Are They Already among Us?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 639 (2002); Dave Foster, Comment, Get 
Off My Turf! Attorneys Fight Accountants over Whether to Allow Multidisciplinary Practice, 31 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1353 (2000); John Paul Lucci, Note, New York Revises Ethics Rules to Permit 
Limited MDPs: A Critical Analysis of the New York Approach, the Future of the MDP Debate After 
Enron, and Recommendations for Other Jurisdictions, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 151 (2003); 
Stuart S. Prince, Comment, The Bar Strikes Back: The ABA’s Misguided Quash of the MDP 
Rebellion, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 245 (2000).  
 93.  Remus, supra note 25, at 145-152.  
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saw as expanding the bar’s institutional power vis-a-vis judges.  But this 
turn does not necessarily mean that power also shifted to individual 
lawyers in relationship to judges.  On the contrary, during the same 
period that the bar helped develop rules and regulatory institutions to 
govern individual judges, it helped expand the judiciary’s regulatory 
influence over individual lawyers by drafting model professional 
conduct rules for the courts’ adoption, and promoting more aggressive 
formal discipline of lawyers under the courts’ ultimate oversight.94  It 
might be fair to say that as institutions of the bench and the bar have 
increased their influence over each other’s individual members, both 
individual judges and individual lawyers have experienced a loss of 
autonomy. 
For lawyers, professional independence is in tension with judicial 
regulation of the bar.  Independence from the judiciary might include 
freedom not only to criticize judges, but also, at times, to defy them.  
Notwithstanding courts’ regulatory authority, freedom from the judiciary 
would also allow lawyers to resolve, as a matter of professional 
conscience, how to balance conflicting obligations to clients and the 
public. 
Andrew Hamilton might serve as an exemplar of the independent 
lawyer in this respect.95  In 1735, he agreed to defend a New York 
publisher, John Peter Zenger, for the seditious libel of the Governor of 
New York, after two other defense lawyers were disbarred for 
challenging the trial judge’s authority to preside.96  The defense 
conceded that Zenger had published the writings in question, which 
criticized the Governor by innuendo.97  The truth of the criticisms was 
not a defense, according to the trial judge, who ultimately directed the 
jury to enter a special verdict of guilty.98  Nonetheless, defying the 
 
 94.  See generally Altman, supra note 24, at 2492; Green & Roiphe, supra note 6, at 525-26. 
 95.  Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1449 
(1992) (maintaining that the NACDL’s references to the story exemplifies a “central and recurring 
theme in the profession’s narratives portray[ing] the lawyer as champion, defending the client’s life 
and liberty against the government, which is portrayed as oppressor, willing, ready and able to use 
its power to destroy the individual and the values society holds dear”); see also Fred C. Zacharias, 
Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1314-15 (1995) 
(“The concept of professionalism has existed as long as the bar has been organized.  Our 
visualization of early professionals is an idealized image: Abraham Lincoln, the repository of 
wisdom and model of civility; [Andrew] Hamilton and John Adams, the guardians of justice against 
public opinion.”). 
 96.  Zacharias, supra note 95, at 1315 n. 33. 
 97.  PAUL FINKELMAN, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRYAL OF JOHN PETER 
ZENGER 39-52 (1997). 
 98.  Id. 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss3/1
VOL. 46, NO. 3 - ARTICLE 1 - GREEN (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/2013  10:05 AM 
2013] LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE 621 
judge, Hamilton famously and successfully urged the jury to return a 
verdict of not guilty by arguing, contrary to the judge’s instruction, that 
to be actionable the libelous matter had to be false and that the jury, 
from their own personal knowledge, knew the writings to be true.99  
Hamilton has been credited with advocating for “jury nullification, 
which the law forbids.”100 
The argument below is not that lawyers should flout judicial 
authority other than in exceptional situations, or that the judiciary should 
curtail its regulatory role.  But the bar should at least contemplate 
reviving the concept of independence from the judiciary and advocating 
for lawyers to exercise a greater degree of independence from the 
judiciary as exemplified by Hamilton. 
A. Lawyers’ Extrajudicial Criticism of the Judiciary 
In the nineteenth century conception, lawyers’ independence was 
equal in importance to judicial independence and served as a 
justification for limiting courts’ authority to regulate lawyers.101  A 
principal aspect of lawyers’ independence related to their conduct 
 
 99.  See id.; see also Rebecca Aviel, The Boundary Claim’s Caveat: Lawyers and 
Confidentiality Exceptionalism, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1055, 1090 n. 145 (2012) (citing the Zenger trial to 
illustrate that “the judiciary has certainly shown itself capable of the sort of reprisal and retaliation 
that threaten the lawyer’s independence as well as basic functioning”); James F. Ianelli, The Sound 
of Silence: Eligibility Qualifications and Article III, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 55, 67 (2009) 
(discussing the effects of Hamilton’s advocacy); Rebecca Love Kourlis, Not Jury Nullification; Not 
a Call for Ethical Reform; But Rather a Case for Judicial Control, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1110 
(1996) (calling Hamilton’s representation “a celebrated example”). 
 100.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
22.1(g) (4th ed. 2004) (defining jury nullification as “the power to acquit even when [the jury’s] 
findings as to the facts, if literally applied to the law as stated by the judge, would have resulted in a 
conviction”); Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 
1150 (defining jury nullification as “a jury’s ability to acquit a criminal defendant despite finding 
facts that leave no reasonable doubt about violation of a criminal statute”). 
 101.  See, e.g., Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9, 13 (1857)  (“[I]t has been well settled, by the 
rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is 
qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to 
be removed.  The power, however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the 
pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the court 
to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and 
independence of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained by the court, as the rights 
and dignity of the court itself.”); see also Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 302 (1883) (Field, J., 
dissenting) (“What, then, are the relations between attorneys and counsellors-at-law and the courts; 
and what is the power which the latter possess over them; and under what circumstances can they be 
disbarred?  There is much vagueness of thought on this subject in discussions of counsel and in 
opinions of courts. Doctrines are sometimes advanced upholding the most arbitrary power in the 
courts, utterly inconsistent with any manly independence of the bar.”).   
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outside the courtroom and largely outside the context of legal 
representation, namely, their freedom to criticize the judiciary.102 
Among the influential judicial decisions on this theme was Chief 
Justice Gibson’s 1835 decision in In re Austin,103 which I previously 
described as follows in a foreword to a collection of articles on lawyers’ 
role in a democracy:104 
The case involved the disbarment of almost the entire Fayette County, 
Pennsylvania bar for sending and publishing correspondence that was 
critical of and, in the view of the Court of Common Pleas, 
disrespectful of the President of that court.  Underlying the question of 
whether the court had lawful authority to impose this sanction was a 
question about the lawyer’s role: as an “officer of the court,” did a 
lawyer have a duty to refrain from public criticism that the lawyer may 
have intended to improve judicial decision making, but that seemed 
 
 102.  See generally Angela Butcher & Scott MacBeth, Current Developments, Lawyers’ 
Comments About Judges: A Balancing of Interests to Ensure a Sound Judiciary, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 659 (2004); Terri R. Day, Speak No Evil: Legal Ethics v. The First Amendment, 32 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 161 (2008); Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney 
Speech, and Judicial Repetition, 97 GEO. L. J. 1567 (2009); Caprice L. Roberts, Note, Standing 
Committee on Discipline v. Yagman: Missing the Point of Ethical Restrictions on Attorney Criticism 
of the Judiciary, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 817 (1997). 
 103.  5 Rawle 191 (Pa. 1835).  The Supreme Court drew on the Austin opinion in Bradley v. 
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 355-56 (1872), which held that judges are exempt from civil liability for their 
judicial acts within their jurisdiction.  The holding was based significantly on concern for judicial 
independence, the Court reasoning:  
[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice 
that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon 
his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.  
Liability to answer to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the 
judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that 
independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.   
Id. at 347.   
The civil lawsuit in question was brought by a Washington, D.C. lawyer, Joseph Bradley, who was 
disbarred after accosting and threatening the criminal court judge before whom he had defended 
John Suratt for the murder of Abraham Lincoln.  In dicta, the Court took the view that, if the 
allegations were true, there was ample ground for Bradley’s disbarment for failing to “maintain . . . 
the respect due to courts of justice and the judicial acts.”  Id. at 341.  It reasoned that even 
extrajudicial conduct directed at a judge personally could be sanctioned if it interfered with judicial 
independence, quoting Chief Justice Gibson’s observation in Austin that:  
No one would pretend that an attempt to control the deliberation of the bench, by the 
apprehension of violence, and subject the judges to the power of those who are, or ought 
to be, subordinate to them, is compatible with professional duty, or the judicial 
independence so indispensable to the administration of justice.  
Id. at 356.   
Arguably, in a case posing a conflict between judges’ and lawyers’ independence, the former won 
out.   
 104. Bruce A. Green, Foreword, The Lawyer’s Role in a Contemporary Democracy, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1229 (2009). 
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disrespectful to the court?  The lower court perceived that lawyers’ 
“office” implied an obligation of “good fidelity to the court,” and that 
this obligation called for the “observance of that trust, courtesy, and 
respect, which is indispensable to the safe and orderly administration 
of justice.”  The [trial] court considered the bar’s public criticism of 
the judge to be inconsistent with this role. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, emphasized the bar’s role 
in protecting the public from government overreaching.  It viewed 
lawyers’ professional independence as intrinsic to this role, no doubt 
recognizing that the judiciary was sometimes among the government 
entities from which the public needed protection.  “To subject the 
members of the profession to removal at the pleasure of the court,” 
Chief Justice John Bannister Gibson explained, 
would leave them too small a share of the independence 
necessary to the duties they are called to perform to their 
clients and to the public.  As a class, they are supposed to be, 
and in fact have always been, the vindicators of individual 
rights, and the fearless asserters of the principles of civil 
liberty; existing where alone they can exist, in a government 
not of parties or men, but of laws! 
The legal profession’s prescribed role did not mean that lawyers were 
entirely free from regulation, including judicial regulation.  But it did 
imply limits on the courts’ regulatory authority.  Lawyers acting 
outside the context of a legal representation or a judicial proceeding 
were entitled to engage in the same lawful conduct, such as the 
publication of nonlibelous criticisms of the court, that other private 
citizens could undertake.105 
A later nineteenth century decision on this theme, Ex parte 
Steinman and Hensel,106 was authored by George Sharswood, the 
Pennsylvania Chief Justice who is regarded as the father of modern legal 
ethics.  His published lectures on legal ethics profoundly influenced the 
development of the first national ethics code, the 1908 ABA Canons of 
Professional Ethics.107  Decided in 1880, the case involved two lawyers 
who edited a Lancaster newspaper that published an article about a local 
criminal trial that ended in the acquittal of a local political figure.108  The 
article asserted that the acquittal “was secured by a prostitution of the 
 
 105.  Id. at 1241. 
 106.  95 Pa. 220 (1880). 
 107.  See Altman, supra note 24, at 2421, 2426-36; Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the 
Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Code, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992). 
 108.  95 Pa 220. 
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machinery of justice to serve the exigencies of the Republican Party,” to 
which the trial judge belonged.109  Regarding the publication as a breach 
of the lawyers’ professional fidelity as sworn officers of the court, the 
trial court disbarred them.  But the state high court, drawing significantly 
on the Austin opinion, concluded that doing so was an abuse of the 
court’s discretion.110  Justice Sharwood observed: 
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the 
expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or 
integrity of judges than members of the bar.  They have the best 
opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment.  They are 
in constant attendance on the courts.  Hundreds of those who are called 
on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals 
as jurors, witnesses or parties.  To say that an attorney can only act or 
speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be 
deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges 
whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position 
too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present 
system.111 
The Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908 by the ABA, 
alluded to lawyers’ independence from judges.  The very first Canon 
said that lawyers should “maintain toward the Courts a respectful 
attitude,” but lawyers have the right and duty to submit “grievances to 
the proper authorities” when “there is proper ground for serious 
complaint of a judicial officer,” and “such charges should be encouraged 
and the person making them should be protected.”112  Another Canon 
stated: “No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should 
restrain [the lawyer] from the full discharge of his duty” to support the 
client’s cause.113  Orrin Carter, the early twentieth century judge and 
legal ethicist, drawing heavily on Justice Sharwood’s opinion, discussed 
lawyers’ freedom to take issue with judges, at least outside the 
courtroom.114  He wrote: 
After the case is finished, any fair comment is justifiable.  The 
unwritten law of the profession is that a lawyer, when defeated, has a 
right to cuss’ the court, and this privilege is often taken advantage of, 
many times for the purpose of relieving the lawyer himself of the 
 
 109.  Id. at 236. 
 110.  Id. at 239.  
 111.  Id. at 238-39. 
 112.  ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 1 (1963).   
 113.  Id. at Canon 15 (emphasis added).   
 114.  See CARTER, supra note 34, at 68.  
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responsibility for the loss of the case.115 
A Minnesota state supreme court decision held in 1908 that a 
lawyer who personally criticized a judge in a letter to the press was 
immune from sanction for expressing his opinion, no matter how 
reprehensible.116  The court distinguished the situation from one where 
the lawyer writes directly to the judge.  After surveying the relevant case 
law, including the Austin and Steinman decisions, the court noted the 
tension between the interest in judicial independence, which warranted 
protecting the courts from unfair criticism, and lawyers’ independence: 
Few acts could be more disgraceful than the deliberate publication by 
an attorney capable of correct reasoning of such baseless insinuations.  
The case is of that sort which, considered of itself, might easily make 
bad law.  But the question presented is vitally important to the entire 
bench and bar of the state, and even more so to its people, whose 
servants we are.  It concerns not merely the power of the court to 
protect itself from undeserved censure, but involves in its 
determination that independence of the bar, upon the preservation of 
which civil liberty itself in large degree depends . . . .117 
The court concluded that there were sufficient extrajudicial incentives 
against unfairly maligning judges and courts, and that the lawyer had the 
right like any citizen to publicly criticize the court.118 
Today, in contrast, the organized bar’s mission, in significant part, 
has been to defend the judiciary from attack, in order to protect the 
independence of the judiciary.119 The bar has not cultivated or 
encouraged lawyers’ criticism of judges, has not defended it, and has 
 
 115.  Id.  See also Hon. Robert H. Jackson, A Testimony to Our Faith in the Rule of Law, 40 
ABA J. 19, 20 (Jan. 1954) (“We maintain our right respectfully to criticize what we may think 
errors of honest judgment by our courts and judges, but we can show no leniency toward judicial 
partisanship, faithlessness, carelessness or irresponsibility.”). 
 116.  State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212 (Minn. 1908).  
 117.  Id. at 216. 
 118.  Id. (“[W]e adopt as our conclusion here these words of Justice Brewer: ‘After a case is 
disposed of, a court or judge has no power to compel the public, or any individual thereof, attorney 
or otherwise, to consider his rulings correct, his conduct proper, or even his integrity free from 
stain.’”) (quoting In re Pryor, 18 Kan. 72, 76 (1877)); see also id. at 215 (“In the terse, but 
comprehensive, language of Mr. Justice Holmes: ‘When a case is finished, courts are subject to the 
same criticism as other people.’”) (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907)).  See 
also In re Hickey, 258 S.W. 417 (Tenn. 1923) (overturning contempt sanction against lawyer for 
publishing article unjustifiably criticizing the court).  
 119.  See, e.g., Resolutions and Reports, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/justice_center/judicial_independence/resources/resolutions_rep
orts.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013) (collecting ABA reports and resolutions on judicial 
independence).   
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discouraged it by subjecting some criticism to professional sanction.  
ABA Model Rule 8.2 provides: 
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false 
or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the 
qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public 
legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or 
legal office.120 
This and other rules have sometimes been read very broadly, in a 
manner likely to chill legitimate criticism; however, the bar has not 
protested. 
For example, in 2010, David Soares, the District Attorney of 
Albany County, New York, was disciplined for publicly criticizing a 
judicial opinion.121   The factual background is that a defendant under 
criminal investigation sued Soares in Florida, alleging that the 
prosecutor and his office were engaged in wrongful conduct in New 
York.122  The defendant then successfully moved to disqualify Soares 
from prosecuting him and to dismiss the indictment that grew out of the 
investigation by persuading the trial judge that the prosecutor had a fatal 
conflict of interest arising out of his role as a party in a civil litigation 
brought by the accused.123  Regarding this outcome as absurd, the district 
attorney wrote to a reporter: 
Judge Herrick’s decision is a get-out-of-jail-free card for every 
criminal defendant in New York State.  His message to defendants is: 
“if your DA is being too tough on you, sue him, and you can get a new 
one.”  The Court’s decision undermines the criminal justice system and 
the DA’s who represent the interest of the people they serve.  We are 
seeking immediate relief from Judge Herrick’s decision and to close 
this dangerous loophole that he created.124 
Soares’s assessment of the trial court’s decision was correct, and the 
appellate court reversed it.125  His rhetoric was unexceptional.126  
 
 120.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 8.2 (2013).   
 121.  In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d 233 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2012).   
 122.  Id. at 243. 
 123.  Id. at 243-44. 
 124.  Id. at 235. 
 125.  Soares v. Herrick, 928 N.Y.S.2d 386 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011), aff’d, 20 N.Y.3d 139 
(2012).  
 126.  See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009) (law’s purpose was to close a 
“dangerous loophole”); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006) (regarding potential 
application of the exclusionary rule to no-knock entries of residences: “The cost of entering this 
lottery would be small, but the jackpot enormous: suppression of all evidence, amounting in many 
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Nonetheless, the appellate court sanctioned Soares for making a public 
comment that, in its view, was prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.127 
As both a lawyer and a public official, the District Attorney might 
have criticized the trial court decision, even in strong language, to let the 
public know his office’s view of the ruling and the steps it would take.  
He did not have to stand by silently until appellate proceedings were 
commenced and were resolved.128  But even if Soares’s comments to the 
press were excessive, imprudent or publicly undesirable, or his 
motivations were impure, self-serving or illegitimate, one might perceive 
the court’s sanction as an encroachment on lawyers’ professional 
independence from the judiciary, and particularly, an encroachment on 
lawyers’ liberty to publicly criticize judicial decisions.  Soares did not 
confront the judge either in or out of court or otherwise threaten the 
judge or disrupt proceedings.129  Nor did he libel the judge or impugn 
the judge’s integrity; he simply took issue with the decision.130  Notably, 
the appellate court did not apply Rule 8.2, nor could it.131  While 
preserving a traditional restriction against libeling judges, the rule does 
not forbid lawyers, outside the context of court proceedings or judicial 
filings, from expressing highly critical, insulting or unmerited opinions 
about judges’ performance and decisions.  Instead, the court invoked a 
vague catch-all rule against conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice, without regard to the license implicitly granted by Rule 8.2 to 
express negative and unfounded opinions.132  The fact that an appellate 
court sanctioned the prosecutor without a moment’s reflection about the 
implications for lawyers’ independence, or, for that matter, prosecutors’ 
independence as public officials, suggests one significant respect in 
 
cases to a get-out-of-jail-free card”).  
 127.  In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d 233.  Another decision along similar lines is Matter of 
Westfall, 808 S.W. 2d 829 (Mo. 1991).  Westfall, the St. Louis prosecutor, criticized the trial judge 
for dismissing a prosecution on double jeopardy grounds.  At a televised press conference, Westfall 
characterized the trial judge’s reasons as “somewhat illogical, and I think even a little less than 
honest,” said that the judge “really distorted the statute and I think convoluted logic to arrive at a 
decision that he personally likes,” and accused the judge of having “made up his mind before he 
wrote the decision, and just reached the conclusion that he wanted to reach.”  A divided court held 
that these statements amounted to sanctionable misconduct and reprimanded Westfall.  Id. at 831-
32.  By way of contrast, see Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2012) (permitting a cause of 
action for attorneys who were threatened with discipline for criticizing the judiciary). 
 128.  See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (recognizing the First 
Amendment’s application to attorney’s public comments about a pending criminal case).  
 129.  In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d 233. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  See id. 
 132.  Id. at 244. 
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which the idea of professional independence from the judiciary has 
diminished in significance since Gibson’s and Sharswood’s day. 
B.  Lawyers’ Disobedience of Court Orders 
Questions of lawyers’ independence may also arise in the 
courtroom: How should a lawyer respond to a ruling that the lawyer 
believes to be erroneous?  The ordinary rule is that the lawyer must 
comply, out of respect for the court’s authority and as a matter of orderly 
judicial procedure.133  But are there situations where, in the exercise of 
independent judgment, it is ethical, even if not necessarily lawful, for a 
lawyer to refuse? In such situations, should the bar support and 
encourage lawyers who act on “professional conscience,” as a matter of 
independence?  Even more so than the question of whether lawyers may 
criticize judges, this question poses a tension between lawyers’ duties as 
officer of the court and the concept of lawyers’ independence.134 
In Maness v. Meyers,135 the Supreme Court addressed this issue in 
the context of deciding whether a lawyer could be held in contempt of 
court for advising a client to disobey a court order for the production of 
documents, where the lawyer believed that the order violated the client’s 
right against self-incrimination.  The Court began by stating the general 
principle that people must obey court orders: 
We begin with the basic proposition that all orders and judgments of 
courts must be complied with promptly.  If a person to whom a court 
directs an order believes that order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, 
but, absent a stay, he must comply promptly with the order pending 
appeal.  Persons who make private determinations of the law and 
refuse to obey an order generally risk criminal contempt even if the 
order is ultimately ruled incorrect. . . .  The orderly and expeditious 
administration of justice by the courts requires that “an order issued by 
a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be 
obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper 
proceedings.” . . . This principle is especially applicable to orders 
issued during trial. . . .  Such orders must be complied with promptly 
and completely, for the alternative would be to frustrate and disrupt the 
progress of the trial with issues collateral to the central questions in 
 
 133.  John R.B. Palmer, Collateral Bar and Contempt: Challenging a Court Order After 
Disobeying It, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 238 (2002). 
 134.  See generally Lawrence N. Gray, Criminal and Civil Contempt: Some Sense of a 
Hodgepodge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 337 (1998); Palmer, supra note 133.  
 135.  419 U.S. 449 (1975).  
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litigation.136 
The Court then acknowledged one context where disobedience of a court 
order is considered ethically proper, namely, when the party has a good 
faith belief that the court order violates a legal or constitutional 
privilege, e.g., the attorney-client privilege or the right against self-
incrimination.137 
The Court recognized that a person directed to produce information 
has “a choice between compliance with a trial court’s order to produce 
[information] prior to any review of that order, and resistance to that 
order with the concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if 
his claims are rejected on appeal.”138  In that situation, “[c]ompliance 
could cause irreparable injury because appellate courts cannot always 
‘unring the bell’ once the information has been released.”139  The Court 
held that where the lawyer advised a client in good faith to test the trial 
court’s ruling by defying it, even though the appellate court 
subsequently upheld the trial court’s ruling, sanctioning the lawyer 
personally would encroach upon lawyers’ professional independence as 
a counselor: 
The assertion of a testimonial privilege, as of many other rights, often 
depends upon legal advice from someone who is trained and skilled in 
the subject matter, and who may offer a more objective opinion. . . .  If 
performance of a lawyer’s duty to advise a client that a privilege is 
available exposes a lawyer to the threat of contempt for giving honest 
advice it is hardly debatable that some advocates may lose their zeal 
for forthrightness and independence.140 
The Court quoted a 1903 opinion similarly holding that a lawyer 
could not be punished for erroneously advising a client: 
In the ordinary case of advice to clients, if an attorney acts in good 
faith and in the honest belief that his advice is well founded and in the 
just interests of his client, he cannot be held liable for error in 
judgment.  The preservation of the independence of the bar is too vital 
to the due administration of justice to allow the application of any 
other general rule.141 
 
 136.  Id. at 458-459.  See also In re Schofield, 66 A.2d 675, 679 (Pa. 1949) (quoting Scouten’s 
Appeal, 40 A. 481 (1898) and citing other authority). 
 137.  Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460 (1975). 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id. at 466.   
 141.  Id. at 467 (quoting In re Watts, 190 U.S. 1, 29 (1903)).  In a recent case involving similar 
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Ethics rules recognize that, at least from a disciplinary perspective, 
lawyers have some leeway to test court rules that they believe are wrong.  
Rule 3.4 (“Fairness To Opposing Party And Counsel”) provides that: “A 
lawyer shall not: . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of 
a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid 
obligation exists.”142  But a judge may hold a lawyer in contempt of 
court for willfully disobeying its order.  Sometimes courts impose civil 
contempt orders merely pro forma, designed to permit the lawyer who 
has disobeyed in good faith immediately to appeal the court’s ruling;143 
if the lawyer’s appeal is unsuccessful, the lawyer presumably will then 
comply with the order and the order will be vacated.  There is a tradition 
of refusing to answer questions and going into contempt in order to 
preserve a claim that noncompliance is justified by the attorney-client 
privilege or the right against self-incrimination.  But not all unlawful 
court orders are subject to challenge in this manner.144  Moreover, even 
if appellate review is available, a court may also elect to impose a harsh 
criminal contempt sanction designed to discourage the lawyer from 
appealing unless the lawyer is certain that he or she will be vindicated 
and that the matter is important.145  Further, a court may leave a 
contempt sanction in place, or even pursue additional sanctions if a good 
faith appeal is unsuccessful, and particularly if the lawyer persists in 
disobeying the court after exhausting opportunities for review.146 
One might view a lawyer’s willingness to stand up to the court, 
notwithstanding a threat of judicial sanction, as an exercise of 
professional independence.  At the same time, one might argue that 
courts should give lawyers latitude to do so.  Some courts have done so, 
as in two Ohio cases involving lawyers named Jones.147  In one case, 
 
issues, a Michigan state trial judge held a defense lawyer in contempt for defying the judge’s 
direction to remain silent and advising his client not to answer questions based on the right against 
self-incrimination.  Ultimately, the contempt order was reversed and a disciplinary complaint was 
filed against the judge. Complaint Against Kenneth D. Post, available at 
http://jtc.courts.mi.gov/downloads/FC90.formalcomplaint.pdf. 
 142.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2013).   
 143.  See, e.g., Seventh Elect Church in Isr. v. Rogers, 688 P.2d 506, 512 (Wash. 1984) 
(“When an attorney makes a claim of privilege in good faith, the proper course is for the trial court 
to stay all sanctions for contempt pending appellate review of the issue.”).  
 144.  See Pennsylvania v. Int’l. Union of Operating Eng’rs, 552 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1977).  
 145.  Cf. In re Grand Jury, 680 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2012).   
 146.  See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Rubin, 549 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1989) (lawyer held in contempt and 
disciplined where the lawyer refused to represent a criminal defendant who planned to commit 
perjury); see also People v. Stewart, 656 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dep’t 1997) (upholding criminal 
contempt prosecution of lawyer for violating court order to testify regarding a former client). 
 147.  State v. Jones, No. 2008-P-0018, 2008 WL 5428009 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2008) 
(vacating contempt order where a lawyer assigned to represent a defendant in the morning refused 
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Brian Jones, was assigned to represent a criminal defendant named Scott 
in connection with a misdemeanor assault charge.148  Although Scott had 
been referred to the county public defender’s office after his initial 
appearance two months earlier, because of the way the appointment 
system is structured in Ohio, it was evidently Scott’s responsibility to 
initiate contact with that office, and he did not do so until the day before 
the scheduled trial date.149  Jones had been with the public defender’s 
office, and indeed out of law school, for only a few months.  The next 
morning, Jones informed Judge Plough, the trial judge, that he was 
completely unprepared because he had been assigned to the case the day 
before.150  Noting that three prosecution witnesses were present, Judge 
Plough instructed Jones to take the next two hours to prepare for a trial 
that would begin after lunch.151  At the afternoon session, Jones 
informed the court that he had not interviewed the state’s witnesses 
during the lunch break and again stated that he was unprepared for 
trial.152  Judge Plough found Jones in direct contempt of court and had 
him taken into custody until the end of the day, when the judge ordered 
Jones released on bond and set a sentencing date for one week later.153  
Judge Plough admonished Jones for failing to file a written request for a 
continuance after he was assigned to the case the day before, and 
expressed his view that Jones should not have refused to follow the 
court’s order because if Scott had been convicted at trial, any 
unconstitutional ineffectiveness of counsel could have been remedied on 
direct appeal.154 
Jones’s conduct, although in willful disobedience of a court order, 
might be viewed as a significant expression of professional 
independence by a lawyer who stood up to judicial authority, at 
considerable personal risk, in good faith, to promote his own sense of 
professional responsibility.155  Significantly, this was not in the context 
of an assertion of an evidentiary or constitutional privilege, where 
disobeying court orders in good faith is generally considered legitimate 
 
to proceed to trial the same afternoon); In re Jones, 724 N.E.2d 839 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (vacating 
criminal contempt sanction where a lawyer refused court order to turn over tape recording received 
from the police, finding that the discovery order was erroneous).   
 148.  State v. Jones, No. 2008-P-0018, 2008 WL 5428009 ¶2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2008).  
 149.  Id. at ¶ 2.   
 150.  Id. at ¶ 3. 
 151.  Id.   
 152.  Id. at ¶ 4.   
 153.  Id.  
 154.  Id.   
 155. See id. 
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and contempt orders are often pro forma.  Representatives of the 
criminal defense bar supported Jones in his appeal, and ultimately, the 
intermediate appellate court reversed the contempt conviction.156  It 
found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance 
where defense counsel feared violating the defendant’s right to effective 
representation and the ethical duties of competence and zealous 
representation, and that “[d]efense counsel should not be required to 
violate his duty to his client as the price of avoiding punishment for 
contempt.”157  But it was not a foregone conclusion that the court would 
do so. 
This illustrates an aspect of professional independence that is rarely 
discussed, explained, analyzed, taught, or theorized.  It is addressed 
mostly in the context of criminal defense.158  The literature of the legal 
profession generally assumes that lawyers must obey judges, except 
when court orders are stayed to allow for appellate review, and that is 
undoubtedly true as a general proposition.159  Perhaps this is invariably 
true as a legal matter, in the sense that judges, if they choose, can 
exercise contempt power to compel lawyers to comply with their orders.  
But from the legal profession’s perspective, this does not have to be true 
as an ethics matter.  Sometimes, disobeying a court order is considered 
professionally tolerable or even laudatory, as where the lawyer goes into 
contempt to challenge an order erroneously calling for disclosures of 
privileged information.160 Sometimes, though, disobedience is 
considered professionally improper even if, in hindsight, the court order 
was invalid.  And then there are cases in between involving a lawyer 
who in good faith, but unsuccessfully, challenges a disclosure order, and 
the lawyer may be punished afterward for contempt but perhaps not 
sanctioned for a disciplinary violation.161 
 
 156.  See id. 
 157.  Id. at ¶ 24.   
 158.  See, e.g., Randolph N. Stone, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Responding to the 
Judge or Supervisor Demanding Unethical Representation, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 5, 13 (Rodney J. Uphoff, ed. 1995) (discussing State v. Lennon, 454 
N.Y.S.2d 621 (1982)). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See, e.g., Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490, 498-99 (Wash. 1968) (“[I]f the attorney follows his 
conscience and chooses the second alternative [namely, disobeying the court], and if this court 
agrees that the desired information was privileged, then the contempt citation is dismissed and the 
attorney vindicated.  But in that second ‘if’ lies the attorney’s dilemma, as the contempt citation 
stands if this court holds with the lower court.  Such a procedure might be justified if the application 
of the attorney-client privilege to any set of facts were clear and definite; but certainly not when, as 
here, the application of the privilege is rather obscure.”). 
 161.  See, e.g., In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1953):  
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The question of when a lawyer ethically should or may stand up to 
the court and when the lawyer should stand down is one that courts, as 
regulators, have the least objectivity to resolve.  In general, courts’ 
institutional interests are at stake.  When the issue arises in a particular 
case, the judge whose authority is questioned may perceive a personal as 
well as institutional threat to judicial authority.  Courts are in a position 
similar to that of executive agencies when placed in the dual role as 
parties and regulators, that is, the role that the bar fears most from a 
perspective of professional independence.  Lawyers collectively should 
hesitate to cede this question to courts.  But the bar has not made an 
effort to delineate lawyers’ proper function or to press their position.  
The absence of robust discussion may reflect, in part, the bar’s 
reluctance to alienate judges by calling attention to their fallibility and 
the occasional legitimacy of defying them.  That is, the bar’s stake in the 
courts’ status and independence may undermine the bar’s willingness to 
assert lawyers’ individual independence from the judiciary. 
  
 
We think this Court should not accept for itself a doctrine that conviction of contempt 
per se is ground for a disbarment. . . .  We do not recall any previous instance, though 
not venturing to assert that there is none, where a lawyer has been disbarred by any court 
of the United States or of a state merely because he had been convicted of a contempt.  
But we do know of occasions when members of the bar have been found guilty of 
serious contempt without their standing at the bar being brought into question.  It will 
sufficiently illustrate the point to refer to the tactics of counsel for the defense of William 
M. Tweed.  Those eminent lawyers deliberately and in concert made an attack upon the 
qualifications of Presiding Judge Noah Davis, charging him with bias and prejudice.  At 
the end of that trial, after he had pronounced sentence on Tweed, Judge Davis declared 
several defense counsel guilty of contempt.  Not one of these lawyers, apparently, was 
subjected to disciplinary proceedings in consequence of that judgment.  Among them 
were Elihu Root, later to become one of the most respected of American lawyer-
statesmen, and Willard Bartlett, destined to become Chief Judge of the New York Court 
of Appeals.  These two were excused from any penalty, beyond a lecture on their ethics, 
on the ground of youth and domination by their seniors—a rebuke perhaps more 
humiliating than a sentence.  One of the seniors who participated in the contempt, and 
certainly one of its chief architects, was David Dudley Field.  He later was elected 
president of the American Bar Association. 
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C.  Lawyer’s Independent Resolution of Ethics Questions 
As exemplars of professional independence, one might say of 
Lincoln, Adams and Hamilton, that they not only stood up to outside 
pressures but that they did so in furtherance of their own understanding 
of their professional role and obligations.162 They exemplified 
independence in a negative sense, resisting outside pressures, but also a 
positive sense, exercising independent professional judgment about 
appropriate professional conduct.  They benefitted, of course, from the 
limited amount of regulation at the time.163 
Today, in contrast, lawyers’ latitude to exercise independent 
professional judgment when it comes to the profession’s tough questions 
is arguably quite limited.  The courts adopt rules, generally based on the 
ABA Model Rules, designed to dictate lawyers’ response.164  Naturally, 
the ABA endorses lawyers’ conformity with the rules.  But one might 
argue that it is a further aspect of lawyers’ professional independence 
that lawyers decide hard ethics questions for themselves, in good faith 
and as a matter of independent professional judgment, even, at times, in 
contravention of applicable rules.165  If so, this is a further aspect of 
lawyers’ professional independence that the bar fails to recognize. 
In the rule making process, the bar has not recognized that 
professional independence is promoted by maximizing lawyers’ 
discretion to resolve hard questions for themselves.  Consider, for 
example, the highly debated issue of how lawyers should react when a 
client who testified in a judicial proceeding later admits to the lawyer 
that he or she has lied.166  At one time the ABA rule was that the lawyer 
had to keep the client’s confidences.167  Later, the rule became that the 
 
 162.  See supra text accompanying notes 32-37 (discussing Abraham Lincoln), 59-68 
(discussing John Adams), and 95-100 (discussing Andrew Hamilton). 
 163.  See Robert B. McKay, The Future of Professional Independence for Lawyers, in THE 
LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE, PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 41 (1984) 
(before the twentieth century, “lawyers were truly independent . . . .  [T]he legal profession was 
subject to no effective regulation except such limited restrictions as might be imposed by individual 
judges upon individual lawyers who appeared before them”).   
 164.  See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.  
 165.  Cf. Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The 
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 336-39 (1987).  
 166.  See Bruce A. Green, Lying Clients: An Age-Old Problem, 26 No. 1 LITIGATION 19, 20-23 
(Fall 1999) (discussing evolution of the rule); see also Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences 
and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939 (1988); Bruce A. Green, 
Ethically Representing a Lying Cooperator: Disclosure as the Nuclear Deterrent, 7 OHIO ST. J. OF 
CRIM. L. 639 (2010); Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case Against 
the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339 (1994). 
 167.  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B)(1) (1980). 
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lawyer must correct the client’s perjury.168  Obviously, the question is a 
hard one.  Arguably, there is no right answer, certainly, no answer that is 
right for all situations.  Given reasonable arguments on both sides of the 
question, an obvious approach would be to give lawyers freedom to 
implement their individual intuitions and philosophies.  But the bar, 
despite emphasizing the rhetoric of lawyer independence, does not 
regard questions such as this one as significantly implicating 
professional independence. 
This is not to say that rules afford lawyers no discretion.  In some 
situations, when lawyers have to resolve the tension between client and 
public interests, the rules afford lawyers some leeway.169 The 
assumption is that lawyers will not exercise discretion self-interestedly 
or arbitrarily,170 but that they will exercise professional judgment on an 
ad hoc basis in light of the relevant facts and applicable professional 
values.171  One set of provisions that operate in this way allows lawyers 
to prevent or rectify client frauds that made use of the lawyer’s 
services.172  But the ABA adopted these much-debated limitations on the 
confidentiality obligation only under pressure from the SEC in the wake 
of the Enron corporate scandal.173 The SEC threatened to make 
disclosure rules of its own for securities lawyers if the ABA did not 
act.174  The ABA regarded the SEC’s proposal as a threat to the bar’s 
independence, and although the ABA’s permissive rules ultimately 
expand lawyers’ independence, the bar did not recognize that as a 
positive feature.175 
The rules’ generally constricted approach to resolving professional 
conduct problems undermines the interest in promoting independence in 
other aspects of lawyers’ work.  For example, one of the themes of the 
literature on professional independence is that, in counseling clients, 
 
 168.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2013).  
 169.  See Green & Zacharias, supra note 58, at 285-86.  
 170.  Professional conduct rules leave latitude in other areas for lawyers to act in their own 
interests or based on their own values, such as in deciding whether to accept a private client.  See 
Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. OF LEGAL 
ETHICS 19, 25-26 (1997). 
 171.  See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 58.  
 172.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) & (3) (2013); see also DANIEL R. 
COQUILLETTE, REAL ETHICS FOR REAL LAWYERS 182 (2005); Elisia M. Klinka & Russell G. 
Pearce, Confidentiality Explained: The Dialogue Approach to Discussing Confidentiality with 
Clients, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 157, 162-66 (2011); see generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 
58, at 296-97. 
 173.  See generally, Green & Zacharias, supra note 58, at 271-72. 
 174.  See id.  
 175.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note 2.  
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lawyers have become technocrats: lawyers tell clients what the law 
allows them to do or help clients figure out how to get around the law to 
achieve their objectives, but lawyers do not take a page from Abraham 
Lincoln, telling clients when their objectives are socially unworthy.176  
But when it comes to lawyers’ own professional conduct, when lawyers 
are called upon to advise themselves how to comply with their own legal 
and ethical obligations, the bar’s rules encourage lawyers to become 
technocratic.  The question for lawyers is not how to balance competing 
professional values, but what do the rules require.177 
The fact that the rules constrain lawyers’ discretion might signify 
that the bar does not trust its lawyers to reach the right resolution of what 
the Model Rules refer to as “difficult ethical problems.”178  Or it might 
mean that the bar has greater confidence in its members’ collective 
ability to make general rules covering a range of situations ex ante than 
in individual lawyers’ ability to reach right answers on an ad hoc basis in 
particular cases.179  Or the bar’s reluctance to develop rules privileging 
lawyers’ professional independence might reflect that the bar gives 
greater priority to other professional values, such as client 
confidentiality. 
The limited discretion afforded lawyers might also reflect the 
paradoxical nature of “professional independence.”  What I mean is this: 
Professional independence, in the sense of self-regulation, is 
increasingly under attack from executive agencies, legislatures and 
members of the public who do not believe that together the bar and 
judiciary adequately police lawyers.180  The bar’s claimed authority to 
 
 176.  See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of 
Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 61-69 (2003) (discussing 
earlier versions of the rules that allowed lawyers to decry conduct “unworthy of lawyer assistance” 
and arguing the present limitation obstructs better lawyering); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion 
in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090, 1113 (1988). 
 177.  The analogy is not perfect.  One might constrain lawyers’ discretion regarding their own 
conduct, because, in resolving their own ethical questions, lawyers cannot bring to bear the same 
objectivity that they would employ in counseling a client.  See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: 
The Legal Profession: The Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 239, 245-47 
(1998). 
 178.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 9 (2013). 
 179.  Rather than developing rules to be adopted by courts and made enforceable, the bar could 
develop unenforceable guidelines that reflected the bar’s collective judgment while still giving 
lawyers discretion.  The ABA does that in the criminal prosecution and defense contexts, for 
example.  See generally Bruce A. Green, Developing Standards of Conduct for Prosecutors and 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1093 (2011).  
 180.  See Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and the Idea 
of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079, 1094-99 (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA 
Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 714-20 (1981); 
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regulate its members depends on the perceived efficacy of lawyer 
regulation.  The persuasiveness of the bar’s claim depends in part on 
limiting lawyers’ discretion.  That is, lawyers must be well regulated, not 
necessarily prudently regulated, but in the sense of amply regulated.  
Even if we were to trust lawyers to reach correct decisions on their own, 
the public would not share this confidence and would likely seek to have 
other institutions fill the perceived vacuum.  In other words, the more 
independence the profession affords lawyers individually, the more the 
bar’s collective independence will be threatened. 
Just as lawyers must occasionally address whether to violate a 
seemingly unfair court order, they must sometimes decide whether to 
disregard a professional conduct rule that, in context, appears unfair or 
inapt.181  Generally speaking, the bar takes a dim view when lawyers 
disregard disciplinary rules, and understandably, given the bar’s interest 
in a well-regulated profession.  But there may be situations overlooked 
by the bar where transgressions can be seen as laudatory expressions of 
professional independence. 
An example was a possible confidentiality violation by Staples 
Hughes, a North Carolina lawyer, who, in the mid-1980s, defended a 
man named Cashwell, who was one of three co-defendants on murder 
charges.182  Cashwell repeatedly and convincingly told Hughes in the 
course of the representation that Cashwell was solely responsible for the 
two murders.183 After Cashwell was convicted and sentenced to life 
imprisonment, one of the co-defendants, Hunt, sought to call Cashwell 
to testify on his behalf, but on Hughes’s advice, Cashwell asserted the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, and Hunt was convicted.184  Many years 
later, after Cashwell committed suicide in prison, Hughes spoke up 
about his client’s admissions.185  Hunt’s lawyers sought a new trial 
based on Hughes’ testimony and other new evidence, including new 
forensic evidence; however, the state judge who presided over the 
proceedings believed that Hughes was violating his confidentiality duty 
 
William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the 
Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1453-54 (2006). 
 181.  See Bruce A. Green, Lawyer Discipline: Conscientious Noncompliance, Conscious 
Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1307 (1998). 
 182.  The following facts are taken from Professor Nancy Moore’s affidavit in support of 
Hughes and from newspaper accounts, including Titan Barksdale, Lawyer’s Revelation of 
Confession May Ruin Him, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C), Jan. 2, 2011, at 1A, 14A.  
 183.  Adam Liptak, “When Law Prevents Righting a Wrong,” N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/weekinreview/04liptak.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=0.   
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
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to the deceased client and threatened to refer Hughes to the disciplinary 
authorities if Hughes testified.186  Only two states have an explicit 
exception to their confidentiality rules allowing disclosures to prevent a 
wrongful conviction or punishment,187 and North Carolina is not one of 
them.  There are strong competing interests on both sides of the 
question.188  Hughes resolved the question on his own and testified, 
arguably in defiance of the applicable ethics rule, and certainly in 
disregard of the judge’s threat.189  After studying the matter, the state 
disciplinary authority ultimately decided not to institute charges.190 
Arguably, the bar should encourage lawyers like Hughes to risk 
violating a rule to implement a good faith and considered judgment 
about the optimal resolution of a professional conduct question that the 
rule’s drafters did not closely consider.  Obviously, lawyers should be 
circumspect about testing rules.  Lawyers should be law abiding.  
Beyond that, the professional conduct rules reflect a judicial consensus, 
based on the collective views of lawyers who have studied a question, 
and the rules are generally worthy of respect.  Lawyers addressing their 
own conduct in context are less objective and detached than rule makers.  
But rules are not perfect and have limitations.  They do not necessarily 
anticipate every problem lawyers face or may lead to unfair results for 
unanticipated reasons.  If the bar took a strong view of professional 
independence, it might open a conversation about when lawyers might 
legitimately violate professional conduct rules. But that is an 
inconvenient conversation for the bar, which sponsors the professional 
conduct rules and promotes their enforcement while currying favor with 
the judiciary. 
 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)(C) (2009); MASS. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2013); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 64 (2000). 
 188.  See, e.g., Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Confidentiality and Wrongful 
Incarceration, 23 CRIM. JUST. 46, 46-49 (2008) (supporting an expansion of the exceptions to 
confidentiality); Colin Miller, Ordeal By Innocence: Why There Should Be a Wrongful 
Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 391, 
395-403 (same); Inbal Hasbani, Comment, When the Law Preserves Injustice: Issues Raised by a 
Wrongful Incarceration Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
277 (2010) (arguing an expansion of the exception is dangerous). 
 189.  See James E. Moliterno, Rectifying Wrongful Convictions: May a Lawyer Reveal Her 
Client’s Confidences to Rectify the Wrongful Conviction of Another, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 811, 
820-21 (2011). 
 190.  Academic literature suggests that it is rare for lawyers publicly to violate ethics rules as a 
matter of professional conscience, i.e., to act in “civil disobedience” of the rules.  See Robert B. 
Palumbo, Comment, Within Each Lawyer’s Conscience a Touchstone: Law, Morality, and Attorney 
Civil Disobedience, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1068 & n.59 (2005). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The ABA sees professional independence as an important value.  
But some uses of the term tend to trivialize the concept.  The ABA is 
right to react when the professional independence of a foreign bar is 
threatened by an oppressive government abroad.191  But the ABA has 
expressed similar concern that the U.S. bar’s professional independence 
is threatened by accountants at home.192  One might be skeptical of both 
the ABA’s use of the term in the title of a professional conduct rule that 
is essentially a conflict of interest rule and the bar’s invocation of the 
concept in the context of debates over whether to liberalize that rule to 
permit multidisciplinary practices.193 
At the same time, both the bar’s rules and its rhetoric tend to 
undervalue an aspect of professional independence that may have been 
taken more seriously in the nineteenth century, namely, independence 
from the judiciary.194  Perhaps, as the bar has succeeded in one of its 
early projects, raising judicial standards,195 the need to be able to 
criticize or challenge judges has diminished.  But the bar may also be 
motivated by its recognition that its influence over the regulation of 
lawyers derives from the judiciary.  To implement its vision of the 
optimal professional norms, the bar must persuade courts to adopt and 
enforce its model rules.  Model rules that encouraged lawyer criticism of 
judges or lawyer defiance of judges’ rules and rulings would undermine 
the courts’ institutional self-interest and ultimately hold little appeal for 
the courts. 
Although the bar portrays a symbiotic relationship between the 
profession’s institutional independence (in the sense of self-regulation) 
and the independence of individual lawyers,196 there is also a tension 
between these two concepts, insofar as individual lawyers might seek 
independence from the judiciary.  Promoting lawyers’ institutional 
independence from other government agencies requires encouraging 
judicial independence and public respect for the judiciary, which would 
in turn be undermined by a robust idea of professional independence 
from the judiciary. 
 
 
 191.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 193.  See supra notes 72-92 and accompanying text. 
 194.  See supra part IV. 
 195.  See note 94 and accompanying text; Remus, supra note 25, at 130-39. 
 196.  See supra part II.   
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